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THE SIGNIFICANCE AND EARLY INTERPRETA-
TION OF THE STATUTE OF USES*
In or about the year 1500, three facts regarding uses became
so prominent as to demand attention. First and foremost
stood the fact that feoffments to uses had become or were becoming
a popular method of conveyance.' The Common Law judges declared
more than once that the greater part of the land of England was
held by uses.2 The benefits of uses as a tenure were so apparent-
the escaping of tile feudal incidents and of the liability of the land
to distress for debt, the ease with which the use could be sold or
devolved, the ability to create future estates-that, while a certain
allowance must be made for an element of exaggeration in the state-
ments regarding its popularity, there can be little doubt that they
were substantially true.
Uses had been very much employed during the Wars of the
Roses to save the family lands from escheat and forfeiture. Coke
was inclined to believe that this was not an inconsiderable influence
in effecting their great and rapid growth.8
Next in importance ranked the fact that uses and cestui que
use were fully recognized and protected only in Equity. Statutes
had been passed, cases had arisen in the Common Law Courts, and
at times a certain protection had been afforded the cestui que use at
Common Law: but there can be little doubt that it was far from
being complete protection. The Common Law judges regarded the
feoffee to uses as the legal owner of the estate, and as legal holder
not only of the seisin but of the specific enjoyment of the land.
He might sell it or entail it or dispose of it as he would, and so long
as he followed the Common Law forms, the cestui que use had no
remedy except in equity. The cestui que use possessed, indeed, no
nominal right whatever to sue the feoffee at Common Law in a real
*Reprinted from Washington University Studies, Vol. I, Part II, No. 1.
I Some have thought that the words "ad usum" in common law forms occur
first in Henry VII. See Madox, Formulare Anglicanum, form 353, 14 Hen. VII,
and 354, 21 Hen. VII. Bacon thought that uses had most favor between 11
Henry VI and 1 Richard III. Bacon on Uses, p. 27.
'Year Book, 19 Hen. VIII, f. 24. Year Book, 27 Hen. VIII, f. 10, and
also f. 21. Coke was of this opinion, probably on the authority of these very
precedents. Co. Litt. 272 a.
2 1 Coke, Chudleigh's Case. "There were two inventors of uses, fear and
fraud, fear in times of troubles and civil wars to save their inheritances from
being forfeited, and fraud to defeat due debts, lawful actions, wards, escheats,
mortmains, etc."
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action, for he had no land at Common Law and was not in the eye
of the Law in legal possession of any. Thus if the land of England
was becoming to a. considerable extent land enfeoffed to uses, and if
the cestui que use had full protection only in equity, it was becoming
sufficiently plain that there was danger that the active land law of
England would in the future be found rather in the books of the
Lord Chancellor than on the Rolls of the Common Pleas.
Thirdly, appeared a most important fact, that the immediate
effect and perhaps the chief purpose of uses was the freeing of
the land from feudal incidents and dues. No formal livery, seisin,
or entry, was necessary to vest a valid equitable estate in the cestui
que use. No wardship, marriage, aids, primer seisin, or the like,
could be demanded from him, for legally he held no estate. Here
was a serious pecuniary loss to the King and the great landlords.
The revenue of a great estate during wardship went in large measure
to the overlord: primer seisin was a whole year's income from the
estate and sometimes more. All feudal incidents were in large
measure pecuniary, and to deprive the lord of them at a time when
ready money was scarce, rents paid (even when commuted) chiefly
in kind, and the possibility of selling produce small because of the
non-existence of anything like a general demand outside the imme-
diate neighborhood, was a far more serious matter than we of
the twentieth century are at first liable to imagine. These inci-
dents often comprised the whole of the lord's revenue outside of
what he needed for actual subsistence. Then, too, in the early six-
teenth century, the need for money, or rights which could be turned
into money, was infinitely greater than ever before, and hence in
like proportion more valuable. The great man, the powerful man,
was coming to be not so much the man who owned great estates
and had many tenants, as the man with ready money to buy the
costly clothes and armour, to hire the troops of personal servants
and liveried retainers, in which the age delighted. In the middle
ages land had been the great social force. In the sixteenth century,
ready money was coming to be so necessary an adjunct to a great
estate, that, without it, the land would ensure small social prestige
and slight political power.
In this prevalence i~f uses, this protection of uses only by
equity, and this loss of the feudal incidents from lands enfeoffed
to uses, we find the reasons for the movements which culminated
in the Statute of Uses. The Common Law Courts, finding that the
control of the land of the realm was passing from their hands into
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the Court of the Chancellor, seem to have voluntarily accepted the
use and the cestui que use as of much the same status at Common
Law as in Equity. They frankly recognized the fact that the feudal
incidents were lost by the creation of a -use. Then the King and
his nobles, angered by the loss of their feudal dues, and apprehen-
sive lest the new attitude of the Common Law Courts should be-
come precedent and thus rob them of all hope of recovering their
incidents, passed the Statute of Uses-after one refusal by the
Commons in 1532-to extirpate uses, not to preserve them and make
them legal.
The Common Law judges, then, accepted the equitable use and
declared that for some purposes at least it was legal. They declared
that uses were at Common Law as well as in Equity. Before the
statute of Quia Emptores, they asseverated, there was a tenure be-
tween the feoffor and feoffee which was such a consideration as en-
titled the feoffor to be seized to his own use.4 Frequently the ex-
istence of the use at Common Law was placed upon broader grounds
and the clearest statement of these grounds appeared in the very
year in which the Statute of Henry VIII was passed. "Et semble
que un use fuit a I' Common Ley: car un use n'est autre chose forsque
un trust, que les feoffors mit in le feoffe sur le feoffment. Et si nous
dirromus que nul' use fuit a le Common Ley, ensuroit que nul trust
fuit a le Common Ley, ce qui ne peut estre, car un trust ou confidence
est chose qui est fort necessaire entre homme et homme, et au. moins
nul' Ley prohibe ne restrain home, mes que il peut mettre la confidence
a autrui."5
A strong tendency displayed itself in the courts to regard as
legal the canceling of the feudal incidents by means of uses.6 They,
however, made one distinction-that land held of the King in capite
should still be subject to all its feudal burdens.7 There were de-
cisions which recognized the right of the cestui que use to devolve
his land by will and even recognized his right at law to change that
will.$ The cestui que use might will his feoffees to sell his lands after
4 Brook, New Cases, March's translation, 89 (1522) ; Brook, Abr. Feoff. al
Uses pl. 25, 7 Hen. VII; etc.
B Year Book, 27 Hen. VIII, f. 8 a. York, J. loquens. A precisely similar
statement, though not so strong, is in Year Book, 14 Hen. VIII, f. 4, p1. 5.
$Year Book, 28 Hen. VI, f. 11; Year Book, 38 Hen. VI, f. 61 and 62; Year
Book, 10 Hen. VII, f. 10; and 12 Hen. VII, f. 21; 26 Hen. VIII, f. 2 and 3.
7 Keilway, 176.
1 Brooke, Abr. Feoff, al Uses, pl. 1.
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his death and they would be bound by the will, and, even if the original
feoffees suffered recovery or allowed anyone to enter by purchase,
the new possessor would be bound by the will.' The sale of a use
would be good at law.10  "Cestui que use est lie in statute merchant
[i. e., the use will be subject to distraint for his debts] et le court
tient que executor serra sue del terre in use." 1 But a recovery suf-
fered by the cestui que use in tail would bind his feoffees only during
his life.12
The most famous case of all, directly in point here, is the great
case concerning Lord Dacres' will in 27 Henry VIII.1 The Crown
lawyers boldly attacked uses, declaring that they did not exist at
Common Law, that before the time of legal memory (1189) they did
not exist and therefor could not exist at Common Law. But the
judges declared the contrary. "Et que un use fuit a le Common Ley
est prove per les Statutes faits in temps le Roy R. 1' 2 et H. 1' 4.. .
Et auxi il ad este tenu moults ans que un use fuit a le common ley per
Common opinion de tout le Realm . . . Un use n'est auter chose
forsque un trust, quel trust un poit vendre ou donner a son plaisir.
Car jeo dy que n'est ascun doubte mes si jeo vend' a vous mon use,
maintenant sur la vente l'use est change in vous hors dem a personne,
isint j'entend, si jeo dy a vous jeo don mon use de tiels terre a
vous, per ceux parols vous avez l'use, car l'use ne passe sicome le
terre passe: car le terre ne poit passer sans liver4 mes use per nue
parol. . . . Et issint per mesme l'reason que use poit passer per
parol', per mesme reason il poit passer per devis." Montague, the
Chief Justice, added, "Et auxi come adeste di in moults statutes que
use fuit a le Common Ley. Come le statut de 50 Ed. III. Et si fuit
nul raison proverat come in le Civil Ley est dit, Communis error facit
jus. Et serra grand mischief de changer le Ley a or, car moults in-
heritances del Realm depend a cest jour in uses, issint que il serra
grand confusion si ce serra fait."
Over this state of affairs, the Sergeant of the Laws of England
in his Replication to the Student of the Laws of England, waxed
wroth.1 4 "By soche uses, the good common lawe of the Realme, to
Id., pl. 12, 14 Hen. VII and 15 Hen. VII.
10 Id., pL 15, 21 Hen. VII.
21 Id., p1. 25, 7 Hen. VII.
Id., p. 2, 19 Hen. VIII.
13 Year Book, 27 Hen. VIII, f. 7-10.
14 This tract, of whose authenticity there seems to be no doubt, has come
down to us only in a manuscript copy which seems to be of the date of late
Elizabeth or early James the First. The tract was probably written after 1530
and certainly before 1535. So far as we know it was not printed until Hargrave
included it in his Law Tracts, I, p. 329 (1737). This would tend to show, if it
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the which the kings sujjects be inherite, is subuerted and made as
voyde, so that none of the said subjects can be and stand in any
surety of an), possession. . . . Neither deede, ne fyne, ne yet re-
coverye, which make men's titles by the Common Lawe, maketh or
enforceth any man's title at this daye; and all because of this false
and craftie invention of uses as I thincke. . . . And yet do ye,
that be students of the Common Lawe of the realme, maintaine this
untrue and crafty invention in the Chauncery by the colour of con-
science contrary to the studie and learning of the common lawe and
contrary to reason and also the lawe of God."
Such. therefore, being the attitude of the Courts, the King and
his lords became alarmed. The Common Law courts had hitherto
been the only means of enforcing the paying of the feudal incidents, 5
and if they now refused to recognize their binding force at law
the incidents would be indeed lost. Hence, the King and the great
landowners secured the passage of the Statute of Uses to extirpate
and extinguish Uses for all time. The language of the Statute itself
seems clear enough on that point. "Where by the Common Laws
of this Realm, Lands (etc.) be not devisable by Testament nor ought
to be transferred from one to another, but by solemn Livery and
Seisin, Matter of Record," land is conveyed by "fraudulent feoff-
ments," "craftily made to secret uses," by testaments, "sometimes
made by nude parolx and words, sometime by signs and Tokens."
As a result of these practices, feudal lords have lost their just inci-
dents and dues, and suffered manifold other wrongs. Wherefore
this act is passed, "for the extirping and extinguishing of all such
subtle practiced Feoffments, Fines, Recoveries, Abuses, and Errors
heretofore used and accustomed in this Realm, to the subversion of
the good and ancient laws of the same, and to the Intent that the
King's Highness or any other his Subjects of this Realm, shall not in
any wise hereafter by any means or inventions be deceived, damaged,
or hurt, by reason of such Trusts, Uses and Confidences."
Of the enacting clauses there are, however, two possible read-
ings. Each holder of a use should "from henceforth stand and be
seised, deemed and adjudged in lawful seisin, estate, and possession"
of the lands in use "to all intents, construction, and purposes of the
law of and in such like estates as they had or shall have in use."
proves anything, that the ideas it advocated were not as popular with the legal
profession as the ideas of the "Doctor and Student" which he denounced, for
the latter book was reprinted time and time again.
16Outside, of course, of the local manorial courts, which had been not
only ineffective in dealing with the lords and larger tenants, but were now
almost entirely superseded by the Common Law Courts and the Assizes.
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And that "the Estate, Right, and Possession" of the feoffees to uses
should be henceforth in the cestui que use "after such Quality, Man-
ner, Form, and Condition as they had before in or to the Use, Con-
fidence, or Trust that was in them." The first section probably meant
simply that the cestui que use should have legal estate in fee simple
fee tail, etc. ("estates" in its strict sense), as he had before a use in
fee simple, fee tail, etc. The second meant to vest in the cestui que
use, not that sort of an estate he had himself previously held either
in equity or at law, but to vest in him it law the very estate which the
feoffees to uses already held in law. Technically the estate had to
pass to the feoffees before they could pass it on and the statute
meant that they should pass on precisely that bundle of rights and
duties which they received. The makers of the statute certainly
never meant, as was later held, that the clause was to be read as vest-
ing in the cestui que use the estate of "like quality" as he previously
had either at law or in equity. Nothing is said of the estate he had;
he is mentioned only in connection with the estate he is about to
receive.
The first of these interpretations seems to have had some con-
siderable currency immediately after the passage of the statute, but
was later superseded by the second view which, with some notable
exceptions, has held its own ever since. The real intent of the statute
has been completely nullified and even ignored. Passed to abolish
Uses, it has been their chief bulwark at Common Law, and treated,
as their sole legalization. Nor was its actual effect as important as
has been sometimes thought. Chief Justice Vaughan said 'a that the
effect of the statute had been to introduce a general form of con-
veyance by which persons may execute their intents and purposes at
pleasure, "without observing that rigour and strictness of the law for
the possession as was requisite before the statute." Lord Hardwicke
said 17 that the statute had no other effect than to add at most three
words to a conveyance.
But its first effect seems, however, contrary to many opinions,
to have been quite what was intended.18 In 28 Henry VIII the year
following the statute, it was said in court that "the feoffees might
sell the land and change the possession of it by the same reason that
they could limit the use to whom they pleased." Even though they
had no authority from the cestui que use, they might still alter the
1 Vaugh., p. 50.I1' Atk. 591.1 81t is difficult to find cases where the relation of the cestui que use and
the feoffees is the subject of the case, but most cases regard the point indirectly,
and seem to support the point in the text. The reader who wishes to pursue
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use, "for by the first feoffiment made to them, they have a general
authority to change the use at their pleasure."'" In the next year,
it was held that the feoffees to uses could suffer a recovery of the
land and it would bind the cestui que use in tail and his heirs.
That is to say, the use was treated as a legal estate subject to its
rights and burdens, but it was an inferior estate at law to that vested
in the feoffee. The cestui que use does not by any means displace
the feoffee in the eye of the law. In 37 Henry VIII, a man was seized
of an acre of land in possession and of another acre as cestui que
use, and made a deed of feoffment of both. He made livery of seisin
of possession of one, but not of the other, and the Court held that
the land in use would not pass, because he had made no livery.2 '
The two estates were not only considered to be of the same validity,
but they did not merge even when held by the same man (there was
here apparently no question of a difference of tenure). Moreover,
the land in use would not pass without livery; the statute had made
the use a legal estate subject to its inconveniences, burdens, and
technicalities. It had not freed it from them and placed it in its
former position at equity.
The greatest case in support of this view is one too long for
much comment here-Chudleigh's case in 31 Elizabeth, reported by
Coke (1st Report). Here the statute was literally interpreted ac-
cording to the ideas of its makers. "The full intent of the makers
of the act of 27 Henry VIII was . . . to extirpate and extinguish
all uses, in such manner as the statute hath limited." = "It would
be then against the express intent of the makers of the act to pre-
serve uses other than they were by the common law, for they intended
sub modo to extirpate and extinguish them." "Uses invented and
limited in a new manner not agreeable to the ancient common laws
of the land, such uses are utterly extirpated and extinguished by this
act." And all the judges and barons held "that the statute of 27
Henry VIII should not (against the express letter of it) be construed
by equity for the maintenance of these contingent uses." , Yet even
here, despite their manifestation of desire to execute the intent of
the subject further will find most in Dyer, Moore, and the Abridgements. Benloe
is serviceable.
iS Dyer, f. 8, pl. 14.
2 Bro. Abr., tit. Feof. al Uses, pl. 56; 29 Hen. VIII.
21 Bra. Abr., tit. Feof. al Uses, pl. 55; 37 Hen. VIII.
Coke seems to be speaking in this sentence, though probably his words
are based on something said in the case. But if they merely stood for what he
personally thought the law was, they are quite as good evidence here, as if they
had been the dicta of one of the judges.
21 Most contingent uses are today recognized as among those executed by
the statute.
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the founders of the statute, the decision does recognize the validity
of all future uses, if only they are limited according to the Common
Law, and decides merely that contingent uses are not thus limited.
Strictly speaking, "limited" should mean no more than that they
must follow the Common Law rules regarding remainders, rever-
sions, and the like. It does not necessarily refer to the relative posi-
tions of the cestui que use and his feoffee.
The idea of the strict interpretation of the statute soon was
changed to the theory which now obtains4 that the statute executes
at once. and de facto in the cestui que use an estate, which is much
more nearly the old equitable estate which he formerly had in chan-
cery than the same estate at law which was already existent at law
in the feoffee. He seems to have lost the right to escape the feudal
incidents, but to have retained the old privilege of sale, conveyance,
jointure, and the like. The Common Lawyers found a system of law
and precedent regarding uses already in force in equity, and finally
ended by accepting a great deal of it, instead of creating a system
of their own. How much they adopted is still a matter of warm
dispute between the Common Lawyers and the partisans of equity.
And with the equitable system the courts also assumed much of the
equitable theory of interpretation, though not without reluctance.
A certain amount of pressure seems to have been an element in this
acceptance. It seems to be true, despite the controversial statements
of both parties, that the severe attitude of the Common Law Courts
toward uses immediately after the passage of the statute did, for a
time at least, send suitors back to equity in search of the remedies
which they did not find at Common Law. Indeed, the statute seems
to have been at first unpopular.' Then, to save their own prestige
and jurisdiction, the Common Law Courts gave up the attempt to
enforce the letter of the statute, returned to their former opinions and
recognized the estate of the cestui que use as very much the same in
law that he would have had in equity before the statute. It is
easily possible to find cases that contravene this position, for the
early decisions are anything but harmonious, and a failure of the
bench to agree at all was by no means uncommon under Henry VIII
and his immediate successors. There is also eminent authority to
24 The Northern Rebels placed in their proclamation (article II) : "They
desire the repeal of the Act of Uses, which restrains the liberty of the people in
the declarations of their wills, concerning their lands, as well in payment of their
debts, doing the King service and helping their children." Let. and Pap. Henry
VIII, vol XI, no. 705. The King's answer is in vol. XI, no. 780. See also vol.
X, no. 246, for draft acts proposed to Parliament in 1534-35, and a long list of
grievances suffered from uses, drawn probably by a Royalist lawyer.
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the effect that modern uses existed at Common Law before the
statute.A( But even if we grant the existence of uses at Common
Law, it would be difficult to maintain that uses as they existed, under
Henry VIII before the statute were not in the main an equitable
production. It also seems to be true that the uses which were finally
put in practice at Common Law by means of judicial decision were
in the main the old equitable uses.
In 1864, the Common Pleas, by Erie, Ch. J., recognized an
Anonymous case of 1582 26 as the beginning of the modem doc-
trine. "Nota," reads that case, "that cestui que use at this day is
immediately and actually seized and in possession of the land, so as
he may have an assise or trespass before entry against any stranger
who enters without title." The notable point here is that the cestui
que use is so completely vested with the legal estate by the action
of the statute upon the use, that he had no need to enter or perform
(apparently) any Common Law formality in order to be entitled to an
action of trespass where possession was the essence of the action.
Some years later 21 the judges were divided in opinion whether or
not cestui que use must enter before he possesses an estate. Glan-
vill, "He hath no freehold, neither in deed nor in law before entry."
Anderson, "He shall have possession here by force of the
statute and it is in cestui que use before agreement or entry." Yet,
in the end, the judges refused him an action of trespass because not
having entered, he had no possession.
Perhaps the clearest statement at this time of the modem doc-
trine is in Calthorp's Case.38 "Le feoffee devant 27 Hen. 8 fuit le
sole party, que fuit entend d'aver benefit per le grant en judgment
del common ley, et cestui que use navoit ascun interest mes tiel que
le Chancery allow in conscience; et ore puis 27 H. 8 cestuy que
use ad le possession en lid quality et fortne come il ad le use."
A most singular history, this history of the Statute of Uses and
of its interpretation. Made to extirpate uses, and particularly to
2 1 have no wish here even to touch the controversy upon the origin of
Ues between Professor Maitland and Dean Ames on the one side and Mr.
Justice Holmes and Mr. Salmond on the other. Whatever the origin of Uses,
or the phrase "ad opus" or "oeps" was and whatever its early significance was
(which is far more difficult to demonstrate), there can be little doubt that the
sy stem of uses was the creation of equity and not of the Common Law.
X Cro. Eliz. 46. Common Bench. See Erie in Heelis v. Blain, C.B.N.S. 90.27 Owen, 87. 41 and 42 Eliz.
's Moore, 102, pl. 247. Cf. Cooper v. Fraklin, Cro. Jac., 400 (1616), "The
statute never intended to execute any use but that which may be lawfully com-
pelled to be executed before the Statute. . . . The Chancery could not com-
pel him at the Common Law to execute the estate and so the statute doth not
execute it at this day." See also Sammes Case, 13 Co. 54.
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protect the Common Law forms of conveyance and to annul the
position taken by the Courts previous to 1535, the statute stands
today as the legalization of conveyance by uses, and as the basis of
the very theories of Common Law interpretation which it was par-
ticularly designated to abrogate.
ROLAND GREENE USHER.
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